


CONFIDENTIAL

27 September 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, 27 September 1979 (U)

1. Graham Claytor explained to me on a diagram what adjustments he was going to be able to make to our space in the NMIC. The adjustment was no change in the size of my office--but a smaller desk so it would look bigger--and the placement of three desks outside the office for a secretary and assistants. Two of the three desks, however, would be back against the rear wall and they would put a sliding door into the back part of the office because there would be computer terminals between those desks and the main entrance to the office. (C)

2. The Memorandum of Understanding was not yet ready but he thought it could be worked out. (U)

3. He indicated that he had given extremely stern orders (and Captain Jack Baldwin confirmed this later) that this kind of bureaucratic turf-fighting was to cease and that things would be very unpleasant if they had to continually bring this kind of problem to his attention. He therefore thought we could move into the Pentagon and make things work. (C)

4. I told him that regretfully I thought it was too late for that. I could accept the compromise of the office in the NMIC, of course, but that this was another in a long series of compromises from the original concept and at that we still didn't have an MOU. I felt it was unfair to Zellmer to require him to enter into what still could be a bureaucratic fray while settling down into the CT job. (C)

5. I said that instead I would leave the three warning and crisis management people there, I would ask to keep the office in the NMIC, and that I would frequently run NITOs from Langley down to the CCF to

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL CL BY 169947
☐ DECL ☒ REVW ON 27 Sept 85
EXT BYND 6 YRS BY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

use the office in the NMIC and to develop the plans and working arrangements for crisis management in contingencies. In addition, this would help us get ready to fulfill the requirement of the Executive Order for a smooth transition from DCI to SecDef management of the collection assets in periods of hostility. The DepSecDef indicated that he would want to talk to the Secretary about this. (C)

6. Cancel the contracts for the move to the Pentagon if you don't hear from me by 0930 on Friday (28 September) morning--as I will see the Secretary both this evening at the NSC meeting and at breakfast on Friday. (C) *NOTHING HEARD -- CANCEL (per [redacted]). See Mem Rec addendum dtd 28 Sept 79* 25X1A

7. I delivered a copy of the Korean trade study. (U)

8. I did not take up the other issues. (U)

[redacted]
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

25X1A

25X1A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)
Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM		6		
4	DD/NFA		7		
5	DD/CT		X		
6	DD/A	6			
7	DD/O				
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt		6		
13	D/PA				
14	D/EE0				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	PB/NSC		X		
19	ES		X		
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks:

Paragraphs for action/information extracted
as noted above.

AGENDA
for
27 September 1979 Meeting with DEPSECDEF Claytor

Memorandum for the Record of your 21 September 1979 meeting with Secretary Brown.

TAB

SUBJECT

Covered . A

General Items

Not covered . B

Afghanistan - Brief on:

1. Probable airborne unit
2. Number of Soviet troops
3. Loss of VTA comms - impact

Not covered . C

Pak - You may want to alert DepSecDef on possible Pak test - talking points enclosed

*Covered -
handout only* . D

China/N. Korea trade with S. Korea - Handout to DepSecDef.

Not covered . E

Establishment of Tactical Cryptological Program - "FYI" in case DepSecDef raises subject - raises issue of transfers into and out of NFIP